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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses whether there is a systematic difference between the accident rates of 
fixed-term and permanent contract workers that is not just the result of a compositional 
effect.  A pure contractual effect might exist because the short duration of the temporary 
contract reduces the incentives to invest in specific human capital leading to a higher accident 
rate.  I provide two identification strategies to control for selection and reporting biases.  The 
results confirm there is a pure contractual effect that increases the accident probability by 4% 
to 7%. 
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1 Introduction
What are the consequences of allowing for di¤erent contractual arrangements within the labour
market on productivity and workers’welfare? Di¤erent arrangements for labour market institutions
and the types of contracts allowed in an economy may have di¤erent consequences in terms of
labour market e¢ciency and productivity. It is therefore important to take these consequences
into account in order to devise the optimal design for a labour market. Di¤erent types of
contracts have been shown to di¤er in the wages they o¤er1, however, little has been said on
their e¤ect on other aspects such as productivity and investment in human capital.
In this paper I develop the idea that di¤erent types of employment contracts provide di¤erent
incentives to both the worker and the …rm and hence result in di¤erent labour market outcomes.
More precisely I focus on the di¤erential impact of the type of contract on work accident rates
for …xed term contract (FTC) versus inde…nite or permanent contract (IC) workers. In a market
wher e …rms can choose between …xed term and p ermanent contracts for t heir worker s, theory
predicts that workers on …xed term contracts (characterised by a shorter duration and where
rehiring is uncertain) will have a lower investment in speci…c human capital than their colleagues
on permanent contracts. The direct consequence of a lower investment in human capital is that
FTC workers will have a higher probability of having an accident at the workplace.
In many countries there is no di¤erence between the types of contracts legally allowed,
or, these are very si milar and it is therefore di ¢cul t to assess the actual impact of these
arr angements (si nce there is no count er factual avai lable, onl y time vari ation i s useful) . This
is why Spain i s an i deal scenari o to st udy these issues since i t has a dual system in which
temporary and permanent contracts are very di¤erent in terms of job protection. Furthermore
a substantial part of the Spanish workforce (31% in 2000) is on …xed term contracts, and its
accident rate has ‡uctuated substantially in the past 20 years. Spain has the highest work
accident rate in the European Union, and while the European Union average in 2000 was 4.09
1Jimeno and Toharia (1993) show that Spanish workers on temporary contracts receive a lower pay than their
perm  an ent counterp art s.
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accidents per 100 workers, the Spanish incidence rate was 7.07 accidents per 100 workers.
Concerning the di¤erent incidence of accidents between FTC and IC workers, in 1999 the
incidence of work accidents for FTC  workers was 13% whil e that of IC  was 4.1%. The increase
in wor k accidents has gone parallel to that in …xed term contracts (…gur es 1 and 2). Thi s pap er
attempts to explain what part of this very large di¤erence is due to a pure contractual e¤ect.
But there are other elements that create a di¤erential in the accident rates of temporary and
permanent contracts that are not strictly a contractual e¤ect. First, there may be some type
of sel ect ion that results i n FTC  workers being more or less acci dent prone - independently of the
contract type:  for instance i f employer s systematicall y hi re the low  abi lity workers under FTC.
This would result in a higher accident rate for workers that is not a result of a contractual e¤ect.
Second, …xed term contract workers may systematically misreport the true accident rate. As a
result of moral hazard, workers on FTC may report accidents more frequently than IC workers.
On the other hand, having had an accident may be a bad signal to your current employer, who
is also a potential future employer, and to other potential employers. In that case FTC workers
have an incentive to under-report their accidents in order to have a higher probability of having
their contracts renewed. For these reasons FTC may alter the reporting incentives and this will
also re‡ect on di¤erential accident rates.
In this paper I analyse two panels of total work accidents between 1988 and 1998 for 32
industrial branches and apply two di¤erent identi…cation strategies to distinguish the pure
contractual e¤ect from the selection and reporting biases (and of course of observable controls
such as the tenure/age composition of the sector, di¤erent risk across sectors etc.). The …rst
identi…cation strategy uses di¤erences in di¤erences while the second exploits accidents on the
way to work to identify the pure contractual e¤ect.
In what follows I assess what fraction of the raw di¤erence in accident probabilities between
…xed term and permanent workers is due to the pure contractual e¤ect derived from the duality of
contracts, and see if after controlling for all the elements that may a¤ect that gap a di¤erential
between FTC and IC accident rates persists. If this is so, one can conclude that temporary
workers not only earn lower wages (Jimeno and Toharia (1993)) but they also have a higher
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accident risk. This would be consistent with Hamermesh (1999) where increasing wage inequality
is accompanied by increasing inequality in work disamenities including risk of work injury.
The next section describes what determines the di¤erent accident rates between contracts.
Section 3 brie‡y outlines the econometric speci…cation. Section 4 describes the data used and
the i denti…cat ion strategi es. Section 5 pres ents the results and section 6 concl udes.
2 Reasons for a D i¤erential in  Accident Rat es Between
FTC and  IC Workers
From the existing theory we can select two di¤erent sets of reasons why there may be a systematic
di¤erence between the accident rate of …xed term workers and that of permanent workers.
On the one hand investments in speci…c human capital depend on the expected return of
the investment. For workers with short duration contracts the incentives of the employer and
the worker to invest in speci…c human capital are lower than for identical workers with longer
contract durations. These lower investments create a di¤erential in human capital that may lead
to systematically higher accident rates for those with temporary contracts. The e¤ect comes
through the di¤erence in contract durations, and hence a lot will hinge on the probability that
a …xed term worker is rehired on a permanent basis. If the worker is relatively certain that he
will be rehired then there should not be much di¤erence between the two types of contract, but
when rehiring probabilities are low the mentioned e¤ect will be fully at work.
In Spain these rehiring probabilities tend to be low. Güell and Petrongolo (2000) …nd that the
probability of conversion of a …xed term contract into a permanent one went down from almost
20% in 1987 to 7% in 19962. In fact previous studies have shown that …xed term contracts
are used as a ‡exible mechanism to adjust employment to ‡uctuations in the business cycle
rather than using them as a worker screening or testing device (for a theoretical account of this
2They explain that in their sample from the Spanish Labour Force survey (covering the period 1987-1994) a
third of …xed term contracts terminate with a new FTC, a third terminate in unemployment or inactivity and
11% are renewed to a permanent basis. 20% of the spells they observe are censored.
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see Blanchard and Landier (2001)). In that case, the mentioned e¤ect of having a …xed term
contract on accident rates is fully at work.
On the other hand a stream of literature has analysed the moral hazard e¤ects in relation
to work accidents. Fortin et al. (1999) analyse the relationship between workers compensation
(WC) and the probabili ty of reporting acci dents, and incorp orate the interaction between WC
and unemployment bene…t. They argue that if WC is more generous than unemployment bene…t
(UB), those workers who are close to being laid o¤ will try to bene…t from WC as much as they
can. This applies straightforwardly to the case of FTC, and workers who know their contract is
close to ex pi ry will report more since they are entitled t o WC  (and maybe not to UB ). Thi s is
referred to as ex ante moral hazard. There is also a form of ex post moral hazard given by those
who have injuries that are di¢cult to diagnose. These people will claim WC and exaggerate
their state.
In Spain, a FTC worker who has an accident is entitled to 75% of his previous wage as worker
compensation. This may last for a maximum of 12 months (plus six if those extra six months
lead to recovery). To be entitled to bene…t the worker must have made social contributions for
at least 12 months in the previous 6 years (6 months in the previous 4 years before the 1992
reform). The amount of unemployment bene…t received is 70% of the previous wage (80% before
1992) for the …rst six months subject to a maximum and a minimum cap.
Within this system, a moral hazard problem of the ex ante type may appear especially for
young workers on FTC who are not entitled to unemployment bene…t because they have not
been contributing long enough.
Another source of hazard for the temporary workers is that if the probability of being rehired
is increasing in e¤ort, then FTC workers will exert more e¤ort on the job. Intensity of work (or
faster pace to impress the employer) will increase accident probabilities. Jimeno and Toharia
(1996) …nd evidence that this is happening in Spain but do not make the link to the accident
rate3 . At the same time, and following this argument, a systematic under-reporting of accidents
3 In the  empirical  analys is they  pr oxy  e¤ort w ith absenteeism  and because  of the  n atu re  of t he  data  needed th ey
merge absenteism with the states of sickness and accident. They run a probit of the probability of being absent
5
might appear since if having had an accident is a negative signal for the employer and reduces
(re)employment probabilities, FTC workers will tend to under-report accidents. So the reporting
e¤ect may go either way and in our estimation the net e¤ect will be captured by the contractual
e¤ect.
In addition to the human capital and reporting e¤ects, the di¤erence in accident rates
between the two types of contracts may be the result of some type of selection on who holds a
…xed term contract. If it is “bad” workers who are systematically hired on temporary contracts,
then the gap is just a result of some unobserved di¤erence in the quality/ability of workers. The
analysis in this paper provides a way to control for this.
Finally, in the empirical analysis other mechanisms must be controlled for. Workers on FTC
will typically have less tenure and be of younger age (FTC are mainly concentrated on young
people -see table 1). If experience is acquired with tenure then FTC workers will have more
accidents just through this compositional e¤ect. Similarly young workers will possibly have
fewer accidents than older workers. The empirical analysis will account for these compositional
e¤ects to disentangle what is the proportion of the actual raw di¤erence in accident probabilities
that is exclusively due to the type of contract.
3 Econometric  Speci…cation
The probabili ty of an accident can be writt en as a functi on of a ser ies of covariates as y¤ ijt =
Pr(yijt = 1) = f(Xijt; ¯)
yijt = 1 if f (Xijt; ¯) > z¤
0 otherwise
So we will only observe accidents if the function determining the probability of an accident
exceeds some threshold. Aggregating all the individuals in a sector j yields the proportion of
from work  controllin g  for di¤erent measu res of s ector al/occu pation al  accid ent r ates to  sep ar ate  ab sences due  to
accidents.
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the njt individuals in sector j who had an accident in time t. This observed proportion Pjt
is an estimate of the population quantity ¼jt, which is determined by F (Xjt; ¯): A standard
econometric technique to apply to these data is the minimum chi-square logit estimator4 . This
implies estimating:
ln(
¼jt
1 ¡¼jt) = ¯
0xjt (1)
This is estimated by weighted least squares and produces the minimum chi-squared logit
estimates of ¯. Marginal e¤ects are computed as: Ma:effect = ¯ ¤ P (1 ¡ P ); where P is the
average sample probability of an accident.
My analysis consists in computing the sample probabilities of having an accident in a year
by taking the proportion of people in a branch who have an accident in a year. This is regressed
using the minimum chi-squared logit method of a series of covariates that account for the business
cycle, sectoral variables and individual characteristics. The results are computed using the White
covariance matrix. The purpose is to see whether after controlling for all these elements there
is still an e¤ect that is due strictly to the type of contract held. The individual level regression
would be a limited dependent variable regression of:
yijt = 1 if ®+X 0ijt¯1 + Z 0jt¯2 + °1FTCijt + °2dtijt + °3djijt + "ijt > 0 (2)
0 otherwise
Where Xijt are individual characteristics, Zjt are sectoral variables, FTCijt is a dummy variable
of whether the individual is on …xed term contracts, dtijt is a time dummy, djijt is a sectoral
dummy. Since I have data for the proportions ¼cjt of accidents by industrial branch and type of
contract, equation (2) can be naturally speci…ed in the grouped logit framework as:
ln(
¼cjt
1¡ ¼cjt) = ® + x
0
cjt¯1+ Z
0
jt¯2 + °1FTCcjt + °2dtcjt + °3djcjt (3)
Where xcjt are the mean values of individual characteristics by type of contract, sector and time.
Note that it is possible in this framework to identify the coe¢cients of equation (3) : The gap
between the accident rates of the two types of workers will be captured by the coe¢cient °1:
4See  Amemiya (1981) for a  comp lete  an alysis.
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Similarly, if instead using ¼cjt (i.e. accident sample probabilities by contract, branch and
time) ¼jt is used (accident probabilities by branch and time), then the equation to be estimated
becomes:
ln(
¼jt
1¡ ¼jt) = ®
0 + x0jt¯1 + Z
0
jt¯2 + °1FTCjt + °2dtjt + °3djjt (4)
Where FTCjt is the proportion of workers in sector j at time t that have a …xed term contract.
Equations (3) and (4) are the basis of the empirical analysis.
4 Data and  Identi…cation  Strategies
I use the work accidents data published by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social A¤airs in
the Estadistica de Accidentes Laborales (EAT). In Spain all salaried workers must be insured
against work accidents by law. The employer can choose whether to use public insurance with the
national social security or to use a private insurance company (Mutuas de Accidentes laborales).
In the event that an accident occurs there is an obligation to declare it, …ll in a report and
pass it to the insurance company and the Public Administration. From those reports (partes
de accidentes laborales) aggregate statistics on the number of accidents according to di¤erent
classi…cations are published in the EAT.
I use two di¤erent classi…cations from the EAT, and for each of them I have a di¤erent
identi…cation strategy. The aim is to have a measure for the pure contractual e¤ect net of all
compositional e¤ects including the accident proneness and reporting biases.
Firstly I use the number of work accidents by year, industrial branch and type of contract
occurred in the period 1989-1998 to estimate equation (3). I identify the e¤ect of temporary
contracts using a di¤erences in di¤erences method on the e¤ect of holding a temporary contract.
Provided the selection into either type of contract is constant across sectors, i.e. if there is a
selection bias as a function of ability, accident proneness or systematic misreporting, then the
di¤erencing ensures that what is captured in the contract coe¢cient is the pure contractual e¤ect
I am interested in. The problem would arise if the selection was not constant across industrial
branches.
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To assess to what extent this coe¢cient captures the e¤ect of ability or other types of
systematic di¤erences - l ike under or over-reporting - between workers in either ty pe of contr act I
use another dataset, namely the total number of accidents by industrial branch and seriousness
(light, serious, deadly). These data are spl it int o two groups: acci dents that o ccurred at t he workplace
and accidents on the way to work. The identi…cation strategy here relies on the assumption
that the individual probability of having an accident on the way to work is independent of
the type of contract held, but will depend on the accident proneness of workers. On the one
hand, both the probability of having a serious or a fatal accident on the way to work and the
probability of having an accident at work will depend on the accident proneness of the individual.
Hence, introducing the probability of having a serious or a fatal accident in the estimation of
equation (4) will capture the accident proneness and the contract coe¢cient will then be net of
this the ability/selection biased related to accident proneness. On the other hand, if there is a
systematic reporting di¤erence between the two groups (temporary and permanent), this should
be captured by the variation in light accidents on the way to work. But light accidents also
capture the accident proneness di¤erential mentioned before ( assume that one can misreport
light accidents but not serious fatal accidents). So total accidents on the way to work (light,
serious and deadly) in the regression will capture both the selection bias due to di¤erences in
accident proneness and due to systematic misreporting di¤erences of workers on either type of
contract and allow us to identify the pure contractual e¤ect.
Figure 2 presents evidence for the validity of the identi…cation strategy. If accidents on the
way to work capture the changes in the accident proneness composition of both groups, then
the ratio of accidents on the way to work to accidents at the workplace should be stable over
time, everything else equal, and changes in that ratio should only be due to factors that a¤ect
di¤erentially both magnitudes, like the changes in the proportion of people holding …xed term
contract s. The main characteristi c of the1984 reform - a major reform of the Spanish empl oyment
legislati on - was that it intro duced …x ed term cont racts as a standard contract that could be used
under a large number of circumstances (before that date they were seldom used and restricted
to speci…c cases). So we should expect that before the reform this accident type ratio is stable
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and that if …xed term contracts are indeed relevant the ratio will fall as the proportion of FTC
in the economy increases. This is indeed what happens in …gure 2. After the introduction of
…xed term contracts in 1984 the rise in the proportion of workers under FTC is accompanied
by a fall in the ratio of accidents. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the total number of accidents
at work and on the way to work. Both series are smooth and con…rm that the big fall in the
accident type ratio is capturing a progressive change in the risk of work accidents that is due to
the widespread use of …xed term contracts and is not a measurement problem.
This con…rms the validity of the use of accidents on the way to work as a way to identify
the pure contractual e¤ect, since the variation in compositional changes will be captured by the
accidents on the way to work, and hence the coe¢cient on the contract variable will capture the
pure contract e¤ect.
Thus I estimate equations 3 and 4 using two di¤erent panels of work accidents by branch.
The following section describes the covariates used.
4.1 Determinants of the injury probability
To determine the probability of a person having a work accident a number of elements are
relevant. The di¤erence in accident rates of FTC and IC workers could arise from other
di¤erences that have nothing to do with the contract. The most immediate one is that workers on
…xed term contracts have shorter tenure and since the probability of an accident is decreasing in
tenure and experience, FTC contracts will show a higher incidence just from this fact. But many
other elements have an impact on injury probabilities. The determinants of injury probabilities
fall into two categories: that of sectoral or aggregate data, i.e. how sectoral conditions or the
structure of the labour market a¤ect injury probabilities, and then the individual characteristics
of the worker. In the former category I will include the following variables:
- Unemployment rates as an indicator of the business cycle. I use the unemployment rate in
the sector as the number of people that have worked previously in the sector and are unemployed.
- The sector to which the worker bel ongs. Thi s wil l be important s ince di¤ er ent sectors have
very di¤erent risks. I use 32 branches where all economic activities are represented.
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- The s ectoral vacancy rate. This is a proxy for the degree of expertis e of those entering the
labour force. When the vacancy rate is high it should mean that all the experts in the workforce
have been employed and hence that the new recruits will have less expertise.
- Gr owth rate of sectoral growth valued added as a indi cator of t he business cycl e.
- Year dummies are al so included to account for other macr oeconomic e¤ects that may not
be captured in the previous variables as well as a sectoral trend.
The other relevant set of factors are individual characteristics. Among these I include: the
type of contract that captures the di¤erence in accident rates between FTC and IC workers;
the age and tenure distributions and the proportion of people that work overtime hours in the
sector as a proxy for work intensity - computed from the EPA.
Finally, in the second set of results I include the probability of having an accident of di¤erent
degrees of seriousness on the way to work. A precise description of how the covariates are built
can be found i n the Appendix .
5 Results
To analyse the e¤ect of FTC on the probability of work accidents I run the minimum chi-squared
logit method on two sets of data. This provides a quite complete description of the determinants
of work accidents.
First, I use the data of work accidents at the workplace by branch and type of contract from
1989 to 1998. The covariates used in the estimation include the full set of industry variables
(industry gross value added growth rate, vacancies in the industry and sector unemployment
rate) as well as sector and year dummies, and a sector trend. I also include the distribution of
tenure and age in the branch by type of contract. The contract e¤ect is captured by a dummy
variable that indicates if the workers were on FTC. I identify the contract e¤ect as the di¤erences
in di¤erences in accident rates between temporary and permanent workers. Table 5 presents an
analysis of these data.
The sample raw di¤erential in accident probabilities is of about 7 percentage points. FTC
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workers have an accident probability of 11.6% while for IC workers it is 4.5%.
Without introducing any other covariates, the e¤ect of FTC is to increase by 5:8 percentage
points the probability of having an accident. After introducing the set of controls, sectoral and
time dummies the contract e¤ect still survives and explains 7:4 percentage points, i.e. it is larger
than the raw di¤erence. Thus the contract e¤ect estimated by this di¤erences in di¤erences
method is signi…cant and positive and having a FTC increases the probability of accident by
around seven percentage points. One might think that the coe¢cient may be systematically
biased if temporary workers are systematically of a di¤erent quality than permanent workers.
Nevertheless, provided the selection into either type of contract of individuals of di¤erent quality
is constant across sectors (which is a sensible assumption), then the di¤erences in di¤erences
method also gets rid of that systematic “quality” di¤erence and the contract coe¢cient captures
a pure contractual e¤ect.
The behaviour of t he rest of the tcovari ates is as follows. The unemployment rate has a negat ive
impact on accidents, so that when unemployment is high there are fewer accidents because
activity is low. Vacancies and the growth rate of value added increase accidents. The coe¢cients
on the tenure distribution con…rm that the accident probability is higher for people with short
tenure and reaches a maximum for those between 6 months to 1 year of tenure. The results for
the age distribution con…rm that old workers have a higher probability of accident, but I also
…nd that the age group between 25 and 35 have more accidents. This may capture a number
of e¤ects like how careful these groups are at the workplace. Finally, the coe¢cient on the
proportion of workers who did overtime hours, that was used as a measure of work intensity,
is negative and signi…cant. This is probably because the probability of having an accident for
a low tenure worker is higher than that of an experienced worker even when the latter works
overtime. In sectors that prefer to make their workers work extra hours instead of hiring new
workers the accident rate will be lower. Finally, branch and year dummies as well as a sector
trend were included5 .
5Branch dummies were highly signi…cant con…rming the idea that the risk di¤erential between sectors is
important and must be accounted for in the analysis.
12
The results con…rm the idea that there is a contractual e¤ect at work and it appears to be
very large. But as mentioned above if FTC workers are systematically selected according to
some unobserved elements (such as ability), and this selection is not constant across sectors,
then the reported coe¢cient may be capturing that systematic di¤erence and hence biased.
To ensure that there is no underlying characteristic of …xed term contract workers biasing the
results, I exploit the second dataset.
The second set of data records total accidents at the workplace by branch between 1988 and
1998. A grouped logit regression is run on the same set of industry variables as before (there are
again 32 branches), on industry and year dummies and on the age and tenure distributions of the
branch. The contract e¤ect is captured by the proportion of FTC workers in the branch. Note
that most of the accidents are light (the probability of having a light accident at the workplace
is 5%, that of a serious acci dent is 0.1% and that of a deadl y accident is 0.01%), and hence the
probabilities of serious and fatal accidents are too small to run the analysis for the di¤erent
types of accidents. Also note that the results of both regressions are not comparable one to one
but should yield estimates in the same range.
Table 6 shows the results for accidents occurred at the workplace. After controlling for all
covariates, the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the proportion of temporary contracts of one
percent is 0:04:
At this point and as mentioned above, a potential problem with the estimation of the …xed
term contract e¤ect must be dealt with. If there is some type of selection process by which FTC
people are “worse” (or “better”) and hence have more (l ess) accidents -  and the selecti on i s not
constant acr os s sectors - then the FTC  coe¢ci ent will be capturing this. The other probl em is
that FTC workers may consistently over-report accidents (because of the moral hazard reasons
mentioned before) or under-report them, if they want to make sure they are reemployed at the
same …rm (or in a di¤erent one) and want to avoid the stigma of looking like a “bad worker”.
The identi…cation strategy used for these data uses accidents on the way to work and is
based on the assumption that the true probability of having an accident on the way to work
is independent of the contract held. Hence using the proportion of serious and fatal accidents
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on the way to work as a regressor should control for the variation of accidents at the workplace
that are due to variations in the quality of people hired and hence the FTC coe¢cient will be
free from the quality composition problem.
I also assume that the tendency to over/under report an accident for an individual should
be the same whether the accident occurs at work or on the way to work since the compensation
received in either case is the same (in Spain accidents on the way to work are considered by law
as work accidents). Hence variations in the reporting bias because of changes in the composition
of the workforce will be captured by the accidents on the way to work. In this case it is light
acci dent s on the way to work that enabl e the identi…cation since only for thi s ty pe of acci dent
can workers mi sreport the true state. Serious and deadl y accidents are harder or impossible to
misreport, so serious and fatal accidents will capture the “ability” or accident proneness element
of the bias while light accidents will capture both the accident proneness and the reporting
e¤ects.
So, incl udi ng the pr oporti on of serious and fatal accidents that o ccurred on the way to work as
a regressor in the work pl ace acci dents regression, should clean up the systemati c di¤erences
between the two groups and we are left with a pure contractual e¤ect that includes the human
capital and reporting e¤ects. Then using the proportion of all types of accidents on the way to
work also controls for the former and in addition it captures the variation in systematic reporting
di¤erences or other aspects that can be manipulated by the worker.
After introducing the proportion of serious and fatal accidents on the way to work, the
margi nal e¤ect of …xed term contracts is 0. 066 (see Tabl e 7). So after controll ing for syst emati c
di¤erences in accident proneness the contractual e¤ect survives and is about 6.5 percentage
points. Further, controlling for all types of systematic di¤erences including reporting biases
preserves the positive e¤ect of …xed term contracts on the probability of accidents and yields
a marginal e¤ect of 0:039 (Table 8)6. That is, after cleaning the contract coe¢cient of the
selection and reporting biases the contractual e¤ect results in an increase of 4 points in the
6 In any  case  noting the  increase  in t he  R2 in th e  …rst sp eci… cation from  table  6  to  tables 7  an d 8  ind icates th at
accidents on the way to work are capturing a variation that explains a lot of the changes in workplace accidents.
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accident probability.
6 Conclusion
This paper assesses whether there is a systematic di¤erence between the accident rates of …xed
term contracts and permanent contracts that is not just the result of a compositional e¤ect. A
pure contractual di¤erential may arise because the nature of the temporary contract, namely
its short duration, reduces the incentives to invest in speci…c human capital and hence reduces
the expertise of the worker leading to a higher accident rate. On the other hand there may be a
systematic selection of workers into either type of contract due to ability for instance that might
explain why …xed term contract workers have more accidents. Or alternatively FTC workers
may have a systematic reporting bias. I try to separate the di¤erent e¤ects and see if after
controlling for all relevant elements, a contractual e¤ect subsists.
I use a sectoral panel with 32 industrial branches over 11 years. The results show that there is
a contractual e¤ect at work that explains a very large part of the di¤erential. This e¤ect subsists
in the two speci…cations I use, that rely on di¤erent identi…cation assumptions, after controlling
for tenure, age, various indicators of the business cycle, overtime hours work and branch and
year dummies. Having a …xed term contract increases by about four to seven percentage points
the probability of having an accident.
The consequences of these results in terms of social cost and productivity are evident.
Workers on temporary contracts su¤er from higher job insecurity both in terms of lower wages
and higher accident risk. On the labour demand side, there are negative e¤ects of allowing
employers to use FTC to adjust employment to the business cycle at low cost: temporary
contracts imply lower human capital accumulation and potentially lower productivity. A policy
recommendation deduced from these results would be to try to limit the use of FTC to cases
where it is really necessary (i.e. seasonal jobs) and bring in labour market ‡exibility using
another type of i nsti tution that does not have this negative feature; or, set up the conditions so
that more FTC are transformed into permanent contracts and the mechanisms through which
15
 16
the pure contractual effect appears are no longer present. 
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8 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of contract data
Fixed term contract
mean std. dev
Accident probability 0.116 0.105
Mean tenure 0.028 0.005
Mean age 0.307 0.032
Tenure: · 2 months 0.353 0.127
2 months to 6 months 0.296 0.057
6 months to 1 year 0.251 0.844
1 year to 3 years 0.075 0.058
3 years to 10 years 0.0199 0.024
more than 10 years 0.0046 0.009
Age: · 25 0.415 0.132
26 to 35 0.310 0.077
36 to 45 0.153 0.055
46 to 55 0.088 0.049
more than 55 0.034 0.030
overtime 0.115 0.081
Permanent contract
mean std. dev.
0.0457 0.043
0.126 0.021
0.405 0.020
0.016 0.012
0.024 0.014
0.076 0.032
0.104 0.036
0.283 0.046
0.498 0.103
0.099 0.062
0.282 0.055
0.286 0.056
0.216 0.056
0.116 0.044
0.102 0.077
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of accidents by seriousness (at the workplace/on the way to work)
mean std. dev.
Accident probability (yearly)
light, at the workplace 0.0509 0.0460
serious, at the workplace 0.00096 0.00073
deadly, at the workplace 0.000097 0.0011
total at the workplace 0.052 0.0467
light, on the way to work 0.00313 0.00199
serious, on the way to work 0.00020 0.00011
deadly, on the way to work 0.00003 0.000026
Covariates
Mean tenure (years) 0.107 0.028
Mean age (years) 0.389 0.026
Tenure (proportion): · 2 months 0.097 0.045
2 months to 6 months 0.089 0.034
6 months to 1 year 0.121 0.042
1 year to 3 years 0.101 0.036
3 years to 10 years 0.217 0.042
more than 10 years 0.377 0.110
Age (proportion): · 25 0.169 0.061
26 to 35 0.342 0.062
36 to 45 0.247 0.044
46 to 55 0.195 0.039
more than 55 0.122 0.065
Overtime (> 40 hours per week) 0.198 0.141
Table 3: Sectoral variables
Mean Std. Dev.
Proportion of FTC 0.232 0.092
Prop. …rst time unemployed 0.251 0.047
Sector Unempl. rate 0.136 0.055
Gross value added growth rate 0.029 0.039
Vacancies 30399 28886
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Table 4: Simple correlation and regression of FTC proportion on
tenure, age and on the way to work acci dent variables
Simple correlation Regression
Prop. of FTC
Tenure: · 2 months 0.756
2 months to 6 months 0.853 -0.122 0.099
6 months to 1 year 0.638 -0.301** 0.074
1 year to 3 years 0.151 -0.714** 0.081
3 years to 10 years -0.133 -0.798** 0.068
more than 10 years -0.711 -0.692** 0.066
Age: · 25 0.458
26 to 35 0.230 -0.281** 0.054
36 to 45 -0.329 -0.292** 0.064
46 to 55 -0.304 -0.275** 0.072
more than 55 0.046 0.343** 0.0923
Ac to work, serious+fatal -34.925** 13.437
Ac to work, light 2.265** 1.065
Constant 1.009** 0.066
Sector dummies yes
Year dummies yes
Observations 352
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Figure 1: Evolution of FTC and accident rate 1987-1999
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Figure 2: Val idity of the identi…cation strategy
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Source: E.P.A (I.N.E) and E.A.T. (M.T.A.S.); Note: the FTC rate before 1987 is an extrapolation (no data are available before that date).  
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Fi gure 3: Total number of accidents at work and on the way to work
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9 Results
Table 5: Total accidents at the workplace by type of contract
** indicates 5% signi…cance, * 10% signi…cance; std. errors in parenthesis
Coe¢ci ent Ma e¤ ect s Coe¢cient Ma e¤ects
Constant -4.879** (0.084) -156.76** (29.61)
FTC dummy 1.032** (0.114) 0.058 1.502** (0.278) 0.074
U rate x -0.359 (0.615)
GVA growth rate x 0.191 (0.365)
Vacancies x 2.47e-08 (1.23e-06)
Tenure distribution: 2-6 m. x 0.505 (0.350)
6m to 1yr x 1.614** (0.228)
1yr to 3yr x 1.161** (0.434)
3 to 10 years x 0.746 (0.551)
more than 10 years x 1.217** (0.390)
Age distribution:26 to 35 x 1.403** (0.288)
36 to 45 x 0.253 (0.287)
46 to 55 x 0.125 (0.379)
more than 55 x 3.036** (0.580)
Overtime x -1.067** (0.395)
Year dummies x yes
Sector dummies x yes
Sector trend x yes
Observations 640 640
R2 0.212 0.956
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Table 6: Total accidents at the workplace
** indicates 5% signi…cance, * 10% signi…cance; std. errors in parenthesis
Coe¢cient Ma e¤ects Co e¢ci ent Ma e¤ects
Constant -5.094** (0.417) -5.989** (1.074)
Proportion of FTC 1.847** (0.679) 0.091 0.855 (0.565) 0.042
U rate x -0.357 (0.666)
GVA growth rate x -0.051 (0.3324)
Vacancies x 1.75e-06* (9.06e-07)
Tenure distribution: 2-6 m. x 1.502 (1.413)
6m to 1yr x 3.424** (0.905)
1yr to 3yr x 2.931** (0.941)
3 to 10 years x 0.616 (1.018)
more than 10 years x 2.150** (0.841)
Age distribution:26 to 35 x -0.784 (0.781)
36 to 45 x 1.140 (0.801)
46 to 55 x 0.197 (1.053)
more than 55 x -0.543 (1.345)
Overtime x -1.730** (0.510)
Year dummies x yes
Sector dummies x yes
Observations 352 352
R2 0.033 0.970
Table 7: Total accidents at the workplace, control for quality
** indicates 5% signi…cance, * 10% signi…cance; std. errors in parenthesis
Coe¢ci ent Ma e¤ects Coe¢ci ent Ma e¤ects
Constant -5.495** (0.118) -6.764** (0.854)
Proportion of FTC 1.872** (0.495) 0.092 1.348** (0.473) 0.066
Prop. ser.+fat. ac. to work 1795.01** (110.0) 782.41** (71.3)
Set of controls x yes
Year dummies x yes
Sector dummies x yes
Observations 352 352
R2 0.386 0.969
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Table 8: Total accidents at the workplace, control for all unobservable hazard
** indicates 5% signi…cance, * 10% signi…cance; std. errors in parenthesis
Coe¢cient Ma e¤ects Coe¢ci ent Ma e¤ects
Constant -5.366** (0.122) -6.883** (-0.6884)
Proportion of FTC 1.533** (0.555) 0.075 0.786* (0.409) 0.039
Prop. total acc. to work 115.03** (7.540) 71.813** (5.191)
Set of controls x yes
Year dummies x yes
Sector dummies x yes
Observations 352 352
R2 0.454 0.983
10 Construction  of the Variables
Sectors: I had to homogenise the categories of CNAE74, CNAE 92 and the sectors as de…ned
in t he EAT  (whi ch gr oups the subsectors - 2 di gits - i nto 44 indus trial groups). Thi s forced me to
group further some categories and I  ended up wi th 32 “branches” or ”sectors”.
- Work accidents: I have three datasets
1) Total number of accidents at the workplace per industrial branch, year and type of
contract. My analysis considers …xed term and permanent workers only.
2) Total number of accidents at the workplace per industrial branch, year and seriousness of
the accident. This is divided into light, serious and fatal.
3) Total number of accidents occurred on the way to work (in itinere) per industrial branch,
year and seriousness of the accident. This is divided into light, serious and fatal.
Source: Estadistica de accidentes de trabajo, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos sociales
- To obtain the risk of having an accident I built the series of employment per sector (and
type of contract where relevant) from the second quarter of the Spanish labour force survey
(EPA).
- Fixed term contracts: own elaboration of the series
Source: Spanish labour force survey, 2nd quarter 1987-1998, EPA INE
- Unemployment: number of unemployed in the reference week. This is divided into the
number of unemployed in the sector (i.e. those who previously held a job in the sector) and the
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proportion of …rst time unemployed in total unemployment. Own elaboration
Source: 2nd quarter 1987-1998, EPA INE
- Overtime hours worked: proportion of employed who worked more than 40 hours in the
reference week.
Source: 2nd quarter 1987-1998, EPA INE
- Vacancies: number of vacancies posted in the national employment institute (INEM)
Source: Instituto Nacional de Empleo publication.
- Gross value added (sector): I had quarterly GVA for agriculture, industry, construction,
services (market and non market). The series were transformed to constant prices using price
indeces as follows (price indeces were monthly and I took their quarterly average):
Energy: IPRI (industrial price index)energy
Construction and Industry: IPRI general (without energy)
Agriculture: index of pri ces paid to agriculture ( indi ces de precios pagados a los agri cul tures )
Services: IPRI services (except rents)
Source GVA: Valor añadido bruto a precios basicos de la Contabilidad Trimestral de España
(provided by INE), in million pesetas
Source IPRI: indicadores economicos del ministerio de economia (series)
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